Context dependent total energy alerting system for the detection of low energy unstabilized approaches by Portman, Michael Aaron
 
CONTEXT DEPENDENT TOTAL ENERGY ALERTING SYSTEM 





























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science in the 












COPYRIGHT © 2019 BY MICHAEL PORTMAN 
 
CONTEXT DEPENDENT TOTAL ENERGY ALERTING SYSTEM 
























Dr. Amy R. Pritchett, Advisor and Co-Chair 
Department of Aerospace Engineering 
Pennsylvania State University 
 
Dr. Brian German, Co-Chair 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. John-Paul Clarke 
School of Aerospace Engineering 









First, I’d like to thank my thesis committee, Co-Chairs Dr. Amy Pritchett and Dr. Brian 
German, as well as Dr. John-Paul Clarke. Their insight, experience, questions, and 
feedback have made this endeavor fascinating, challenging, and inspiring, and I consider 
my thesis much stronger thanks to their influence. Special thanks go to Dr. Pritchett who 
has been my advisor and mentor for both my undergraduate and graduate career. She has 
truly shaped the academician, engineer, and safety professional that I am today.  I have had 
the incredible fortune of having several other mentors throughout my life and education. 
Captain Buddy Roberts, Dr. Mark Rosekind, and too many others to name have each helped 
me in unique and invaluable ways. Each of these mentors, for their time, passion, and 
interest in me, deserve great thanks. 
A big thanks to my commercial aviation safety colleagues for providing me with the 
platform upon which I ran my thesis, and for exposing me to the amazing world of 
commercial aviation.  I’d like to thank my colleagues in the Cognitive Engineering Center. 
Special thanks go to my thesis partner Martijn IJtsma for copy editing everything I wrote, 
no matter how painful, suggesting edits, and keeping me on task.  Bedank hem namens mij, 
voor al zijn hulp en vriendschap. A big thanks to all my other friends and family, Celine, 
Katie, Logan, Ajmal, Zach and Aria, SK, Kevin, and many more, for supporting me 
through this thesis. 
I’d like to thank Yafa Portman for the unconditional love and support throughout the 
writing process. Lastly, I’d like to thank my mother, Dr. Sandra Portman. From the 
inspiration to pursue academic achievement, to pushing me through the tough times and 
believing in me the entire way, I will forever owe a great debt of gratitude. 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES vi 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS ix 
SUMMARY xi 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction 1 
1.1 Problem Statement 1 
1.2 Contributions 2 
1.3 Overview of Thesis 3 
CHAPTER 2. Literature Review 5 
2.1 What is the Function of an Alert? 5 
2.2 What is Total Energy? 6 
2.3 What is Context Dependency? 6 
2.4 Why Would We Need a Total Energy Alert? 7 
2.4.1 Asiana 214 Overview and Crash Data 7 
2.4.2 Unstabilized Approaches and Stabilized Approach Criteria 10 
2.4.3 Summary 12 
2.5 What are the Attributes of a Good Total Energy Alert? 12 
2.6 Review of Current Technology 13 
2.7 Review of Current Research 15 
CHAPTER 3. Alerting Algorithm Design 19 
CHAPTER 4. Analysis 22 
4.1 Introduction 22 
4.2 Application of the Alerting Algorithm to Asiana 214 23 
4.3 FOQA Analysis 30 
4.4 FOQA Case Studies 38 
4.4.1 Stable Approach Case Study 39 
4.4.2 Low Energy Approach Case Study 41 
4.4.3 General Unstable Approach Case Study 49 
4.5 Summary and Recommendations 53 
CHAPTER 5. Conclusions 55 
5.1 Summary of Findings 55 
5.2 Contributions 56 
5.3 Limitations 57 
5.4 Future Work 58 
v 
 






LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Variants of Alerting Parameters Analyzed. 22 
Table 2. Asiana 214 Kinetic Energy Variation Results. 28 
Table 3. Impact of tsafe on the Time an Alert Would Be Given in the Asiana 214 Flight 
Profile. 29 
Table 4. Alert Variants Used in FOQA Case Studies. 38 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Asiana 214 Final Approach Timeline. 25 
Figure 2. Time History of Asiana 214 Compared to Alerting Threshold Defined by tsafe = 
7 seconds, Potential Energy Multiplier = 1.0, and Kinetic Energy Multiplier = 1.2. 26 
Figure 3.  Time History of Total Energy in Asiana 214 Compared to Alerting Thresholds 
Defined by tsafe = 7 seconds, Potential Energy Multiplier = 1.0, and Varying Kinetic 
Energy Multiplier from 1.5 to 1. 27 
Figure 4. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to Those 
Violating FSF Stable approach criteria for Each Variant of the Kinetic Energy Alerting 
Threshold. 31 
Figure 5. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to Those 
Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for Each Variant of Low Kinetic Energy Alerting 
Threshold. 32 
Figure 6. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to Those 
Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for A Variety of Low Kinetic Energy Alerting 
Thresholds. 33 
Figure 7. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to Those 
Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for A Variety of Potential Energy Alerting 
Thresholds. 34 
Figure 8. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to Those 
Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for A Variety of Safe Time Alerting Thresholds
 36 
Figure 9. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to Those 
Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria, for A Variety of Potential Energy and Safe Time 
Alerting Thresholds. 37 
Figure 10. Time History of Airspeed During a Stable Approach. 39 
Figure 11. Time History of Vertical Profile During a Stable Approach. 40 
Figure 12. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Stable 
Approach with Exemplar Alert Variants. 41 
Figure 13. Time History of Airspeed During a Low Energy Approach. 42 
Figure 14. Time History of Vertical Profile During a Low Energy Approach. 43 
Figure 15. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Low Energy 
Approach with Changing Kinetic Energy Requirements with a Glide Slope Multiplier of 
1.0 and a Safe Time of 7 seconds. 44 
Figure 16. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Low Energy 
Approach with Changing Potential Energy Requirements. 45 
Figure 17. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Low Energy 
Approach with Changing Potential Energy Requirements Expanded to Focus on the Time 
of Alerts. 46 
Figure 18.  Change in Required and Predicted Energies with Varying Safe Time. 49 
Figure 19. Time History of Airspeed During an Unstable but not Low Energy Unstable 
Approach. 50 




Figure 21.  Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During an Unstable but 





LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFE Above Field Elevation 
ALA Approach and Landing Accidents 
ALAR Approach and Landing Accident Reduction task force 
A/T Autothrottle 
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder 
D Drag 
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAF Final Approach Fix 
F/D Flight Director 
FDR Flight Data Recorder 
FLCH Flight Level Change 
FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System 
GS Glide Slope 
h Height 
HAT Height Above Touchdown 
HF Human Factors 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
LAA Low Airspeed Alert 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
x 
 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator 
PEGASAS Partnership to Enhance General Aviation Safety, Accessibility and 
Sustainability 
PF Pilot Flying 
PM Pilot Monitoring 
SAFO Safety Alert for Operators 
T Thrust 
TAWS Terrain Awareness Warning System 
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
TE Total Energy 
TEA Total Energy Alert 
V Airspeed 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VREF Reference Approach Airspeed 
VS Vertical Speed 




This thesis examines context dependent total energy alerting to protect against low energy 
unstable approaches in commercial aviation operations.  Currently, many individual states 
are monitored independently to identify unstable approaches, rather than an integrated 
single assessment of total energy.  An alert would also have to be context dependent, 
integrating the individual states with awareness of phase of flight, approach profile 
modeling, and expected pilot response to individualize the alert’s activation threshold for 
each approach.  This thesis details a design of such a context dependent total energy alerting 
system.  First, a preliminary analysis examines when such an alert would have been given 
in a case study of Asiana Airlines Flight 214.  This flight’s crash on approach into San 
Francisco International Airport was attributed to lack of pilot situational awareness and 
understanding of the aircraft’s autoflight systems, leading to the aircraft having sufficiently 
low total energy that it stalled into the seawall just before the runway threshold.  Analysis 
shows the total energy alert would have sounded roughly 14-41 seconds before impact, 
earlier than any currently installed system and potentially early enough for corrective 
action.  Next, the context dependent total energy alert is analyzed to assess its performance 
in real flight as captured by Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data. The 
analysis examines how alerting parameters impact when and how often the alert is 
triggered, and the thesis concludes with recommendations for the design and application 
of a context dependent total energy alert, along with recommendations for future work. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Currently, the literature defines unstable approaches according to a range of conditions 
including improper airspeed, altitude, deviation from the proper approach path, and 
incorrect aircraft configuration.  Many cockpit alerting systems exist which warn pilots of 
some of these conditions individually.  These systems include low altitude alerts and low 
airspeed alerts, in addition to several additional systems which each independently display 
or warn of the conditions collectively defining unstable approaches.  Nonetheless, no 
system exists which combines these criteria to alert pilots to low total energy conditions.   
These unstable approaches, and corresponding lack of alerting, have led to 
catastrophic outcomes.  Notably, in July of 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214 crashed on 
approach into San Francisco International Airport, resulting in the total loss of the aircraft 
and death of three passengers.  In its final report, the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) cited, as contributing to the accident, a lack of pilot familiarity with and 
inappropriate use of the autopilot system, and lack of pilot situational awareness, 
collectively leading to an unstable vertical profile and speed on approach (NTSB, 2013).  
To enhance the safety of commercial aviation, the NTSB recommended, among other 
rectifications, the development of a context dependent total energy alerting system. 
This thesis introduces such a context dependent low total energy alerting system.  
The alert integrates data already available via sensors onboard air transport aircraft to 
estimate both the aircraft’s current energy state and the trend in total energy.  The system 
projects whether the aircraft’s total energy will become too low within an immediate future 
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time horizon and, if so, alerts the pilot to the danger.  The future time horizon is intended 
to be long enough to allow pilots ample time to recover or abort the approach. 
Much research has taken place to evaluate energy metrics for use in aviation, from 
applications in education and post-flight analysis to design of autoflight systems.  
However, little emphasis has been placed on developing alerts, particularly for situations 
in which pilots are manually flying the aircraft.  Additionally, little research has taken place 
evaluating the real-world utility of such an alert.  To be truly useful, the alert should be 
able to detect low energy unstable approach conditions with a correct detection rate similar 
to or greater than current technology and provide more advanced warning. 
1.2 Contributions 
Multiple research projects and accident investigations have demonstrated the need for total 
energy alerting systems in modern commercial aviation cockpits.  Especially of need is the 
ability to alert pilots engaged in both hand flying as well as interacting with autoflight 
systems.  Through the evaluation of such an alert in its basic form, this thesis will determine 
the alert’s ability to effectively discriminate stable versus unstable approaches as compared 
to current day technology.  This includes developing the algorithms which will improve 
pilot awareness of the aircraft’s energy state.  Subsequently, the work will evaluate how 
alerting parameters impact alert effectiveness, thereby providing recommendations for the 
practical design and application considerations needed for this type of alert.  Unique to the 
work completed in this thesis is the analysis of the alerting algorithm by evaluating its 
performance in real flights as captured by Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
data.  This application allows for a larger-scale analysis of the design metrics of such an 
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energy alert that, previously, was only performed on either small sets of flight data or in 
simulations with pilots actively flying. 
1.3 Overview of Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review by first posing several fundamental questions to 
better define the required attributes of a context dependent total energy alert:  What is the 
function of an alert?  What is total energy?  What is context dependency?  Why would we 
need a total energy alert?  What are the attributes of a good total energy alert?  Next, a 
review of current technology and research is provided, to detail areas of current industry 
interest and progress, and to demonstrate opportunities for further research and 
development. 
In chapter 3, the context dependent total energy alert’s algorithm is presented.  In 
summary, the algorithm creates a sum of energy from both kinetic and potential energy 
sources, and additionally calculates the rate of change of this total energy.  The algorithm 
then predicts the energy state of the aircraft at a given time in the future, as well as 
calculating some minimum required energy at that time.  If the predicted energy is less than 
that which is required, the alert is triggered. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the alerting algorithm across a range of potential alerting 
thresholds.  First, the alert is applied in an analysis of Asiana 214, to determine if the alert 
would have sounded, and if it would have sounded early enough for the pilots to take 
corrective action.  Next, the alert is applied to the digital flight data records of several 
hundred thousand flights provided by a major air carrier.  This analysis highlights 
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important considerations in determining the alert’s threshold.  From this, a series of case 
studies detail these considerations. 
This thesis concludes in chapter 5 by re-evaluating the findings from the thesis, 
discussing the limitations of the analysis, and providing recommendations for the design 
of the alert.  The thesis concludes with the future work required to further validate the 
alerting algorithm and to extend it into the design of a complete alerting system. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several key principles are important to a context dependent total energy alert.  First, this 
chapter defines what an alert is, what properties it holds and what functions it can 
accomplish.  Next, this chapter discusses the idea of total energy, the components of total 
energy important during an approach to landing, and how energy flows from one form to 
another and increases or decays during an approach.  This chapter continues with a 
discussion of context dependency and, finally, highlights the need for a total energy alert 
over alerts currently in use. 
2.1 What is the Function of an Alert? 
First, it is critical to understand the function, purpose, and limitations of an alert.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, Pritchett (2001) provided this definition: 
“An alerting system is an electro-mechanical system capable of monitoring for, 
detecting and announcing conditions anticipated (by the operator or the system designer) 
to impact the operator’s near-term activities.” 
This definition leads to some important properties of alerts.  First, the alert must be 
capable of properly detecting certain conditions requiring input data from sensors capable 
of observing relevant states of the aircraft.  Second, the alert must be capable of announcing 
the presence of these conditions through aural, visual, or tactile annunciators, or a 
combination of such forms.  Lastly, the alert must be given at an appropriate time 
sufficiently early enough to allow the pilot to resolve the condition or abort the approach.  
This consideration should therefore also include whether the operator should be given time 
 6 
to analyze the information to synthesize the best course of action or the timing requires 
immediate action without much thought on the operator’s part. 
2.2 What is Total Energy? 
In the context of this research, total energy is defined as the sum of the aircraft’s kinetic 
and gravitational potential energies, as defined by its velocity and position, and measured 
relative to the elevation of the runway the aircraft is approaching.  In the course of a normal 
approach, some minimum amount of energy is “maintained” in both airspeed (kinetic 
energy), and altitude (above ground gravitational potential energy).  If one energy store 
becomes too high or low, the pilot can correct via a pitching action, effectively 
“transferring” energy from one store to another.  Energy is added to the system by 
increasing thrust.   
Low total energy, in this context, occurs when there is not sufficient energy in the 
system as a whole for a pitching action alone to correct the insufficiency in one store 
without causing insufficiency in the other.  Thus, the only appropriate response to a low 
energy state is to add energy to the system by means of increasing the thrust.  It should be 
noted that this definition is consistent with NTSB recommendations for a context 
dependent low energy alert (NTSB, 2013). 
2.3 What is Context Dependency? 
Context dependency is also key in the design of modern cockpit alerts.  Context 
dependency includes awareness of the aircraft’s state in ways that would impact the 
threshold for alerting.  For example, in airspeed alerting, the phase of flight, as well as the 
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aircraft’s configuration, including gear and flaps, affects the flying characteristics of the 
aircraft and thus affects its stall speed.  Factoring these aspects into the airspeed alert is 
crucial so that pilots are effectively warned in a timely fashion.   
Many early designs of cockpit alerting systems were plagued by lack of context 
dependency.  In particular, early versions of what is now EGPWS (enhanced ground 
proximity warning system) had infamously high false alarm rates (Pritchett, 2001).  These 
were often caused by the system relying solely on radar altitude, rather than incorporating 
a terrain database, thus erroneously detecting excessive terrain closure during approaches 
over terrain that rises up to the runway threshold.   
It is important, therefore, to ensure modern cockpit alerting systems account for 
context dependencies.  In this way, the system can better model and monitor the aircraft’s 
performance.  This allows for alerts to be customized to each scenario, modifying the 
alerting threshold according to important contextual clues including phase of flight, vertical 
approach profile, aircraft weight and thrust setting, as well as flap and landing gear 
configuration. 
2.4 Why Would We Need a Total Energy Alert? 
2.4.1 Asiana 214 Overview and Crash Data 
The following section presents a high-level overview and timeline of the events leading to 
the Asiana 214 crash (NTSB, 2013).  Particular emphasis is taken to show the evolution of 
total energy as apparently resulted from the pilot’s actions and lack of situational 
awareness, demonstrating the need for a total energy alert.  Beginning very early on in the 
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descent, the pilots were advised to prepare for a visual approach rather than the instrument 
approach they typically would fly.  Shortly before crossing the Final Approach Fix (FAF), 
the Instructor Pilot noted that the aircraft was too high, and the vertical speed was 
subsequently set to -1500 feet per minute (fpm).  The aircraft crossed the FAF 
approximately 500ft above the minimum altitude (1,800ft), maintaining a descent rate of -
1,000 fpm.  At this point of the approach, this aircraft was in a very high energy state, being 
slightly fast, well above the glide slope, and at a high rate of descent.  Typically, to maintain 
an approach, descent rates are maintained closer to -500 fpm. 
The aircraft continued into the final approach still in a high energy state, both high 
and fast.  In an effort to quickly decrease the altitude of the aircraft, at 1,600ft altitude, the 
Pilot Flying erroneously put the aircraft in Flight Level Change (FLCH) mode presumably 
to rapidly descend.  This is not the intended use of the system, and because the Pilot 
Monitoring had already input the go around altitude of 3,000ft, the aircraft instead began 
to pitch and throttle to increase its altitude to 3,000ft.  In response to this action, the PF 
retarded the throttles into the idle position.  At this point, one of the Flight Director switches 
remained on.  As a consequence of the design logic for the autothrottle, having a F/D switch 
on caused the autothrottle to remain in HOLD mode, holding the throttles in the idle 
position without a safety “wakeup” function active, seemingly without crew awareness.  
Holding the throttles at idle essentially eliminates the addition of energy into the system as 
a whole, and, when combined with the rapid descent rate, resulted in the aircraft losing 
energy very rapidly. 
By the decision height of 500ft, flight data recorder data shows that, by coincidence, 
most basic parameters (glide slope, airspeed, etc.) were on target; however, the aircraft was 
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still showing a very rapid decay in energy because of the throttles being held at idle and 
the aircraft was maintaining its high descent rate.  Transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder 
show the pilots checking these basic parameters and deciding to continue the approach. 
At slightly above 400ft, as the aircraft descended below the glideslope, the PF pulled 
back on the control column to correct the aircraft’s vertical profile through pitching.  This 
had the consequence of further draining the airspeed of the aircraft.   
Interestingly, the approach continued without any apparent crew awareness of the 
deteriorating airspeed until, at approximately 11 seconds before impact, a Low Airspeed 
Alert quad-chime sounded.  A go around was then initiated.  However, there was not 
enough time for the engines spool up to provide sufficient thrust, and the aircraft impacted 
the seawall just short of the runway threshold. 
During the analysis of the accident, the NTSB referenced previous calls for low 
airspeed alerting, in which systems have already been designed and implemented, as 
having made progress but insufficient to avoid an accident such as this.  As stated in the 
NTSB final report, as well as Boeing submissions during the investigation, the low airspeed 
alert is designed as a caution rather than a warning, designed to direct pilots’ attention to 
the decreasing airspeed, but not as a last-minute warning designed to provoke an immediate 
response.  Therefore, the alert is insufficient in both its ability to provoke immediate action 
and in its ability to convey the type of action needed.  Additionally, the Board cautioned 
that the low airspeed alert by itself “may not be adequately tailored to alert pilots to an 
impending hazard due to a combination of conditions (i.e., low airspeed combined with 
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low altitude).” (NTSB, 2013) Thus, the Board recognized the need for an alert that would 
allow the pilots to be aware of a synthesis of potential and kinetic energy states. 
2.4.2 Unstabilized Approaches and Stabilized Approach Criteria 
The Flight Safety Foundation notes that unstabilized approaches are common in approach-
and-landing accidents (ALAs). (Flight Safety Foundation, 2000) Their Approach-and-
Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) task force identified unstable approaches as causal 
in 66% of approach-and-landing accidents and serious incidents studied between 1984 and 
1997.  Though a concise, broad definition of unstabilized approaches is difficult to find, 
they can be roughly defined as approaches that violate either energy or configuration 
approach requirements in such a way that may significantly increase the risk of continuing 
the approach to landing. 
In association their ALAR task force, the Flight Safety Foundation published criteria 
to officially determine whether or not an approach is stable.  From their manual, the 
following conditions define a stable approach: 
• The aircraft is on the correct flight path as published on the approach plate, and also 
reflected by displays such as glide slope indicators and PAPI. 
• Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path 
• The aircraft speed is not more than VREF + 20 knots indicated airspeed and not less 
than VREF. 
• The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration. 
• Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 feet per minute; if an approach requires a sink 
rate greater than 1,000 feet per minute, a special briefing should be conducted. 
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• Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the 
minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual. 
• All briefings and checklists have been conducted. 
• Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they also fulfil the following: 
instrument landing system (ILS) approaches must be flown within the expanded 
localizer band; during a circling approach, wings should be level on final when the 
aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation. 
• Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the 
above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing. 
If any of these conditions are not met, or broken, below 1,000 feet above airport 
elevation in IMC or below 500 feet in VMC, the approach is considered unstable, and the 
FSF calls for an immediate go around. 
Airlines have operationalized these conditions in pilot training, flight operations, and 
in-flight safety analyses.  In practice, these conditions are taught to the pilots, who are then 
instructed to go around if any of the conditions are broken.  Additionally, airline Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs track these conditions in post flight 
analyses, with triggers in place to automatically flag a flight for further analysis if a certain 
number of the above described conditions are broken. (McFadden, et al., 1999) 
Given that the Flight Safety Foundation criteria can reflect high or low kinetic energy 
alone, or high or low potential energy alone, an alternative approach uses a total energy 
perspective.  The criteria referencing flight path and sink rate could be thought of as 
assessing for a proper potential energy reduction profile.  Similarly, having proper speeds 
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through the approach could be thought of as having a proper kinetic energy profile.  As 
such, particular emphasis on the distance to runway, speed, and altitude metrics are those 
primarily used in this thesis, as they help to define the desired energy state of the aircraft.  
To operationalize this perspective, the number of conditions defining an unstable approach 
could be theoretically reduced from nine to roughly four (proper energy state, and three 
other configuration and briefing conditions). 
2.4.3 Summary 
Implementing a total energy alert would provide an additional safeguard against low 
energy unstable approaches.  As mentioned above, pilots currently have to track several 
different metrics to determine the stability of the approach.  This can not only be a 
cumbersome task in the midst of hand flying an approach, but also leads to missing a 
perspective on the overall state of the aircraft from an energy perspective.  Alerting based 
on total energy and trends in total energy can combine many of these metrics together to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the aircraft’s state and provide an earlier alert for 
the pilots to act upon. 
2.5 What are the Attributes of a Good Total Energy Alert? 
Summing together the previous sections, we can define which attributes make a good 
context dependent total energy alert.  The alert should direct the pilot’s attention to the 
predicted unstable approach.  As a total energy alert, the measure of approach stability 
should be based on a combination of both altitude and airspeed metrics.  Being context 
dependent, the alert should reference the approach being flown and be aware of the 
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aircraft’s configuration and state to ensure the calculations are as specific to each scenario 
as possible. 
In theory, the alert should minimize both Type I and II errors (false alarm and missed 
detection).  However, in practice, there is usually some trade-off between the two.  A later 
warning will help to reduce false alarms but may result in more missed detections and give 
less time for pilots to react; an earlier warning will reduce missed detections, but will 
increase false alarms, potentially becoming a nuisance alarm and leading to pilots 
disregarding it, even in cases of correct detection.  Further, there is no exact standard 
determining when an alert should be given. 
2.6 Review of Current Technology 
There are currently many technologies already installed and in operation aboard 
commercial aircraft today that display and/or alert on conditions contributing to low energy 
on approach (NTSB, 2013; Boeing, 2014).  These include an autothrottle with an A/T 
Wakeup feature, Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), and Low 
Airspeed Alerting (LAA).  These systems add crucial safety features to the aircraft, and yet 
there is still room for improvement. 
• A/T Wakeup:  The A/T wakeup is a system built in to the autothrottle that monitors 
the aircraft’s speed.  When the airspeed is too low, the autothrottle will “wakeup,” 
automatically advancing the throttles.  However, the wakeup feature will only 
activate if the autothrottle is in BLANK mode (i.e. not engaged); where the 
autothrottle is engaged and actively tracking low thrust or airspeed at the apparent 
command of the flight crew, autothrottle will not engage.  (In Asiana 214, the 
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autothrottle was effectively placed into HOLD mode, deactivating the A/T 
wakeup.) 
 
• Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS):  In addition to monitoring 
excessive closure on terrain EGPWS monitors the aircraft’s location with respect 
to the glide slope (which was inactive for Asiana 214) and will sound an alert if the 
aircraft has an excessive vertical speed or an excessive deviation from the glide 
slope.  A critical disadvantage of the EGPWS is that when the aircraft is below 
150ft radar altitude, the system is desensitized. 
 
• Low Airspeed Alerting (LAA):  The Low Airspeed Alerting (LAA) system 
activates a quadruple chime alarm when the airspeed of the aircraft reaches 30% 
into amber band.  (The amber band is a range of airspeed between the minimum 
maneuvering speed and the stick shaker activation speed.)  This allows for pilots 
who are cognizant of the situation to operate the aircraft close to and slightly inside 
the amber band without the nuisance of an unneeded alarm.   
In summary, there are several systems currently in place in air transport aircraft.  
However, there are significant corner conditions in which an alarm is needed, yet no current 
one would sound.  An unavoidable issue with most onboard warning technologies is that, 
to reduce the likelihood of false alarms, these systems are either inactivated or desensitized 
when certain conditions are met, such as distance from an airport during an approach.  
While this does help to reduce nuisance alarms, it does not protect the aircraft against low 
energy conditions close to the airport.  Additionally, because the systems are not 
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interlinked, altitude or airspeed alerts may go off too late, when there is too little energy 
for the pilot to respond. 
2.7 Review of Current and Historical Research 
Significant research has examined energy-based metrics for use in aviation.  These research 
activities include the use of energy-based metrics for applications other than alerting (such 
as vehicle performance analysis and design, flight training and education, as well as flight 
controls) and energy state awareness without energy prediction.  Historically, energy 
modeling was used as early as the 1940’s in the determining of aircraft performance 
characteristics (Rutowski, 1954; Merritt, et al., 1985).  This modeling, whereupon an 
aircraft’s flight characteristics were evaluated as a sum of potential and kinetic energies, 
was useful in determining climb and cruise range characteristics, especially of high speed 
aircraft. 
More recently, a prominent source of research into the field of energy metrics for 
flight has been FAA’s Center of Excellence titled Partnership to Enhance General Aviation 
Safety, Accessibility and Sustainability (PEGASAS).  Projects conducted within 
PEGASAS have examined the use of energy monitoring for general aviation training and 
education, such as energy metrics to evaluate the safety of a flight (Puranik, et al., 2016).  
Several different types of energy were tracked throughout the flight, rather than solely for 
approach, and visualized for post-flight analysis. 
Separately, Dutch researchers have applied energy metrics to commercial aviation 
post-flight analysis.  In The Automatic Identification of Unstable Approaches from Flight 
Data, researchers used data from a sample of commercial flights to evaluate the usefulness 
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of the FSF’s Stabilized Approach criteria (de Boer, et al., 2014).  The basis of this analysis 
is somewhat similar to that proposed in this thesis in that it builds off first principles 
examining state of energy.  However, this analysis only evaluates total energy state, rather 
than evaluating energy decay.  In this way, the system is not useful to give a look ahead 
that would be a hallmark early warning feature of the system proposed in this thesis.  As a 
result, the researchers’ arguments are more directed towards advocating for a correction to 
the FSF criteria, rather than proposing an onboard warning system. 
In addition to flight training and flight safety efforts, there has also been work to 
develop flight control systems which operate on the basis of monitoring energy.  In patent 
filings, Boeing engineers proposed an autoflight system which can, through the use of 
energy metrics, purportedly reduce the complexity of such systems and increase reliability 
(Lambregts, 1985).  It is argued that many of the flight control systems certified for use in 
commercial aviation applications result from years of evolutionary development, steadily 
increasing capability, but also complexity.  Therefore, this clean sheet design would allow 
for simpler effective control over the aircraft.  However, this system was not designed to 
incorporate alerting features for manual flying and was designed for nearly completely 
automated flight.   
Separately, researchers at Delft University of Technology investigated the use of 
energy management in the application to flight path displays (van den Hoven, etc., 2010).  
In this analysis, researchers developed a total energy-based flight path display and 
conducted simulator trials to evaluate the effect of such a display on pilot situational 
awareness of energy state and workload in several approach scenarios.  While it was found 
that this display type increased energy state awareness of the pilots tested, workload also 
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increased with energy display, and further research was recommended to reduce the 
workload resulting from such a display.  Research has also taken place to apply energy 
metrics to optimize approach profiles to reduce noise (Williams, 2004).  This research, a 
part of NASA’s Quiet Aircraft Technology (QAT) project, worked to reduce the noise 
impact of aircraft operations without making aircraft design changes.  To accomplish this, 
the aircraft’s potential energy is maintained, and flaps and gear are held up as long as 
reasonably possible.  In simulator studies, it was found that, on most types of approaches 
tested, pilots were able to fly the approach path given, resulting in fuel and noise reductions.  
It is not known to what degree these systems have been implemented in modern 
commercial aviation. 
Additionally, work has been done to develop energy-based alerting during approach.  
Researchers at NASA Ames have designed an alert similar to that proposed in this thesis 
(Shish et al., 2015; Shish et al., 2016).  Their alert incorporates data from airspeed and 
altitude, as well as knowledge of autopilot states and mode transition logic.  In this way, 
the Ames system aims to address issues of pilot mode confusion and automation error as 
contributing to low energy state approaches.  As stated in their 2015 paper, their system 
seeks to “make the behavior of the automation more transparent to the fight crew, while 
enhancing their energy state awareness, and alerting pilots of problematic autoflight inputs 
or conditions.” (Shish et al., 2015) While the alert did appear to improve both reaction time 
and outcome in simulator studies, it is still designed for pilots interacting with autoflight 
systems, rather than alerting pilots during manual flying scenarios.  Multiple official 
recommendations, including FAA SAFOs (Safety Alert for Operators), have been issued 
to promote manual flying (FAA, 2013; FAA, 2017), especially in approach and landing 
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phases of flight.  Thus, any alert designed to protect against unstable approaches must 
include protections in manual flight regimes.  Additionally, as their system was not applied 




CHAPTER 3. ALERTING ALGORITHM DESIGN 
This algorithm is designed to alert pilots to impending low energy unstable approaches.  
Thus, it is only active during the approach-to-landing phase of flight.  This algorithm, 
similar in principal to that described in “Aircraft Mode and Energy-State Prediction, 
Assessment, and Alerting,” (Shish et al., 2016) monitors and synthesizes information from 
multiple sources, including airspeed and altitude, but is designed to be effective in both 
manual and automatic flight.  These data, when combined, help paint a broader picture of 
the aircraft’s current energy state.   
This is accomplished by, first, summing the aircraft’s current kinetic and potential 
energies and calculating the rate of change of this energy state.  Next, given some safe time 
with which to look ahead, the predicted energy is calculated by accounting for the predicted 
loss of energy by that time.  To establish an alert threshold, a minimum allowable total 
energy profile is then constructed at that future point, with some predetermined minimum 
allowable potential and kinetic energies based on the vertical profile and airspeed expected 
during the approach, respectively.  If the predicted energy falls below the required energy, 
the alert sounds.  This alert will identify situations where added thrust is required because 
a pitching movement would either be ineffective or ill-advised.  This should help reduce 
false alarms based on either low potential or low kinetic energy alone. 
It should be noted that loss of energy due to pitching actions was neglected.  This 
energy loss due to pitching actions account for an energy loss approximately six orders of 
magnitude smaller than other energy sinks accounted for in this analysis and therefore is 
negligible (Carbaugh, 2007). 
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The calculations are mathematically described as follows: 
 1) 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑚𝑔𝑧 +
1
2
𝑚𝑉2.  Total Energy (TE) is calculated as the sum of potential 
(𝑚𝑔𝑧) and kinetic (
1
2
𝑚𝑉2) energies, where z is the height above touchdown, and 
V is the airspeed of the aircraft. 
2) The rate of change of total energy is calculated as 
𝑑𝑇𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑚(𝑔?̇? + 𝑉𝑎) or 𝑚𝑔?̇? +
𝐹𝑉, where ?̇? = vertical speed (taking a three second average to eliminate the 
possibility of turbulence and eddies falsely triggering an alarm), a = the forward 
acceleration of the aircraft, and F = the net longitudinal force on the aircraft (T-D), 
otherwise known as excess thrust. 
3)  In order to determine how far the system should look predict the aircraft’s energy 
state, a safe time is calculated as 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 = 𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ( + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛).  treaction is an optional 
reaction time needed for the pilots to react (maximum of approximately 4-5 seconds 




)) where D is the current drag of the aircraft, and δT is the difference between 
TMax and the current thrust setting.  4.55s is the rise time calculated for the engine 
used on Asiana outfitted Boeing 777-200ER’s, which Boeing states will achieve 
full thrust, from idle, in approximately 10 seconds (Boeing, 2014). 




2 .  The minimum allowable total energy 
(TEminimum) is a dynamic threshold calculated at the future time point using the same 
equation (1) as is used for TE but with Vreq as some multiplier of Vstall.  On modern 
aircraft, Vstall is known onboard the aircraft as a function of aircraft weight and 
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aircraft configuration such gear and flaps setting.  zreq is a linear function of 
predicted lateral distance away from the airport at time tcurrent + tsafe (d) calculated 
by using the vertical profile of the approach in question, 𝑧𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑑 ∗
ℎ(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ) (where n is again some multiplier to allow for minor glideslope 
deviation).  Although almost all approaches use a standard 3 º glideslope, this 
additionally allows for non-standard approaches with glideslopes other than 3º, or 
other approach profiles such as step-down profiles. 




) ∗ 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒.  Summing the originally calculated TE with the 
(presumably negative) ΔTE gives the approximate TEfinal.  From this equation, the 
importance of tsafe can be seen in that tsafe affects the calculation of both the required 
energy and predicted energy.  The effects of tsafe are magnified in cases where 
energy is dissipating from the aircraft quickly, for example when the aircraft is fully 
configured for landing (high drag) and at a very low power setting (low thrust).  In 
these cases, energy loss from the aircraft is magnified and longer tsafe results in 
larger changes in energy. 
 6) If 𝑇𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ≤  𝑇𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚, the system sounds an alarm. 
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
There are two major components to the analysis performed in this thesis.  First, the alert is 
evaluated within the evolution of aircraft state in the Asiana 214 accident.  This is 
accomplished by estimating flight data as obtained from documents submitted by Boeing 
to the NTSB during the accident investigation (Boeing, 2014).  Second, the alert is applied 
to FOQA data to evaluate the alert’s performance across a broad range of flights, including 
those which have previously been labeled as either stable or unstable by current industry 
analyses.  To evaluate the proper alerting threshold, 96 variants of the alert were 
implemented with varying combinations of required safe time, minimum allowable 
potential energy (as determined by a glide slope deviation multiplier), and minimum 
allowable kinetic energy (as determined by a stall speed multiplier).  The specific values 
implemented are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Variants of Alerting Parameters Analyzed. 
tsafe GSx Vstallx 
10 1 1.3 
9 0.9 1.2 
8 0.8 1.1 
7 0.7 1 
6   
5   
It should be noted for context that a nominal approach will typically fly on the glide 
slope (GS multiplier of 1) and will fly at 1.3Vstall, otherwise known as the reference 
approach speed or Vref.  Minimum required energy thresholds in excess of a glide slope 
multiplier of 1 and a stall speed multiplier 1.3 were initially analyzed, but not used in this 
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analysis as these parameters made the alerting algorithm too sensitive, resulting in a very 
large number of undisputedly stable flights to be erroneously flagged as unstable.  
Deviations below a glide slope multiplier of 0.7 or a stall speed multiplier of 1 were not 
analyzed as they are so low energy that the aircraft would have triggered other alerts 
independently.  Finally, safe times are dictated by a combination of federal requirements 
and human factors analysis, with a 5 second minimum per federal requirements of engine 
spool time, up to 10 seconds to allow for an additional 5 seconds of reaction time. 
For this analysis, the vertical profile was assumed to be 3 degrees, as specific vertical 
profiles for each approach were not available for the vast majority of the flights analyzed; 
an onboard system, once implemented, would typically have this information allowing for 
a more contextualized definition of required altitude than possible here. 
Analysis of approaches begins at 2,000 feet Height Above Touchdown (HAT) and 
ends at 50 feet HAT.  This range should begin early enough to detect low energy 
approaches (earlier than current post-flight analysis metrics, which begin at 1,000 feet 
HAT), but late enough to avoid the risk of false alarms caused by the aircraft not yet 
intercepting the approach and starting its vertical profile.  Similarly, variance in the altitude 
measurement close to the ground and during transition to flare can lead to false alarms, 
therefore the analysis is suspended below 50 feet HAT. 
4.2 Application of the Alerting Algorithm to Asiana 214 
A first step to validate the design of the alert is to apply it to the case of Asiana 214.  The 
analysis is based on the time history of aircraft state given in the publicly available NTSB 
docket.  Unfortunately, digital flight data recorder data was not provided in a useable 
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format, and so this analysis was estimated from the graphical time history.  Visually 
examining the published information, it is clear to see that the flight clearly violated several 
Flight Safety Foundation Stabilized Approach Criteria.  These include excessive descent 
rate (at times in excess of 2000 feet/min), excessive glide slope deviation (both in excess 
of two dots high and low), and excessive deviation from VREF with speeds below 110kts 
(VREF in this case was published as 137kts, and 110kts is approximately 1.04Vstall).  
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the aircraft flew for more than a minute with the 
throttles held at idle, significantly lower than the standard approach thrust.   
Boeing’s analysis of the final approach of the aircraft is shown in Figure 1 (Boeing, 
2014).  For the final 40 seconds of the flight, the figure also highlights the moments in the 
timeline at which the aircraft violated FSF criteria.  Additionally, a red vertical line at 12 
seconds prior to impact is shown, indicating the point at which the low airspeed quadruple 
chime sounded.  Lastly, a blue bar is superimposed on the timeline at the bottom, indicating 
the range of times that the low energy alert detailed in this thesis triggers across the 96 
different variants defining the alerting threshold for minimum required total energy. 
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Figure 1. Asiana 214 Final Approach Timeline. 
Range of alerting times of 
proposed context dependent 
low energy alerts 
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As an example, shown in detail, the alert variant examined in Figure 2 employed a 7 
second safe time, along with a glide slope multiplier of 1 and a stall speed multiplier of 1.2.  
The total energy predicted and required by the alerting algorithm are shown through time 
in Figure 2.  This alert variant alerts approximately 29 seconds before impact, 
approximately 17 seconds earlier than the low speed quadruple chime in the accident.  The 
time at which the quadruple chime sounded is shown by the red vertical line.  Additionally, 
the alert variant sounded approximately 6 seconds after the aircraft was considered to be 
in an unstable state by Boeing post-accident analysis, as shown by the orange vertical line.  
However, since no system exists to warn against unstable approaches, no alert sounded at 
that point. 
 
Figure 2. Time History of Asiana 214 Compared to Alerting Threshold Defined by 


















































































Varying the safe time or minimum required potential energy does not change the time 
at which the alert sounds by more than 1 second.  Rather, changes in minimum required 
kinetic energy has the most significant impacts on the timing of the alert.  Several alert 
variants requiring progressively lower kinetic energy from 1.3Vstall to Vstall are shown in 
Figure 3. (All variants maintained a safe time of 7 seconds and a vertical profile multiplier 
of 1.0.) 
 
Figure 3.  Time History of Total Energy in Asiana 214 Compared to Alerting 
Thresholds Defined by tsafe = 7 seconds, Potential Energy Multiplier = 1.0, and 
Varying Kinetic Energy Multiplier from 1.5 to 1. 
The alert variant with a kinetic energy multiplier of 1.1 triggered the closest to the 
quadruple chime at 14 seconds before impact.  Only the alert variant with a kinetic energy 
multiplier of 1.0 alerted after the quadruple chime, at 10 seconds before impact.  These 




















































































dominant effect on the alert as a whole.  Changing other parameters within the alert only 
modify the alert time by a couple seconds, while the alerting time with varying kinetic 
energy changed much more significantly. 
Table 2. Asiana 214 Kinetic Energy Variation Results. 




1.3 41 29 
1.2 29 17 
1.1 14 2 
1 10 -2 
Next, the impact of changing safe time in Asiana 214 is analyzed.  It should be noted 
that, as the safe time parameter is used in calculation of both the minimum required energy, 
as well as the predicted energy, it is not possible to plot the different safe time varying 
required energy plots in the same chart.  Nonetheless, results will be shown in tabular 
format.  In this analysis, the safe time was varied between 5 and 10 seconds (with safe 
times of 0 to 4 seconds shown in Table 3 to help demonstrate the effect of changing safe 
time on alerting time) while holding the glide slope multiplier constant at 1 and the stall 























10 30 18 8413167574 9912283281 -1499115707 
9 30 18 8680641890 9917392138 -1236750248 
8 30 18 8948116206 9922500995 -974384788 
7 29 17 9215590522 9927609851 -712019329 
6 29 17 9483064838 9932718708 -449653870 
5 29 17 9750539154 9937827565 -187288410 
4 28 16 9614490018 9933291762 -318801743 
3 25 13 9665614252 9918920997 -253306745 
2 25 13 9830789389 9923816300 -93026911 
1 24 12 9713507556 9918857410 -205349854 
0 24 12 9876242252 9923685376 -47443125 
Comparing these alert variants, it is clear to see that differences in safe time do indeed 
affect the minimum allowable total energy.  As safe time increases, both the predicted and 
required energy decrease.  However, when the aircraft thrust is low, predicted energy 
decreases much faster than required energy, and thus, with a large enough increase in safe 
time, the alert will sound significantly earlier. 
Overall, most variants of this alert trigger early enough to allow useful pilot action.  
This alert comes much earlier than the FSF stable approach criteria and current onboard 
alerts (In this case, the low airspeed quadruple chime sounded merely 11-12 seconds before 
impact), mainly because this alert evaluates the decay of both altitude and airspeed 
combined. This extra time would have allowed the pilots to recognize the situation, 
increase the throttle and successfully execute a go around. 
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4.3 FOQA Analysis 
Application of the alerting algorithm to the Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
data for a large number of flights assesses its functioning over a wide range of ‘real’ flights.  
More than 500,000 flights were collected from a major American carrier over a six-month 
time frame between July and December 2018.  A variety of aircraft were included, 
including both larger widebody aircraft and smaller narrowbody aircraft.  Some fleets of 
older aircraft were excluded from the analysis due to the onboard recorders not having the 
necessary parameters to complete the analysis.  A variety of airports were included.  
The data analysis began by applying the 96 variants of the alerting algorithm to the 
flights collected.  When the algorithm triggered, i.e., predicted the energy state of the 
aircraft would fall below its minimum required energy state threshold, the flight was 
flagged, and the times when the low energy event was active were recorded.  
Simultaneously, any flights that triggered the FSF stable approach criteria were also 
flagged.  Full details are provided in the results table in Appendix A. 
For the purposes of compliance with a non-disclosure agreement, the data that 
follows is presented in a de-identified fashion, with specific numbers referring to the alert 
rate relative to the rate of detection using the FSF stable approach criteria currently used in 
FOQA analysis that are specific to the energy metrics used in this thesis.  For example, if 
a variant of the alerting algorithm triggers on half as many flights as the FSF stable 
approach criteria, its measure is “50%”, and if an alert triggers on twice as many flights as 
the FSF stable approach criteria, its measure is “200%.”  These measures for the 96 
different alert variants are plotted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to 
Those Violating FSF Stable approach criteria for Each Variant of the Kinetic 
Energy Alerting Threshold. 
The highest minimum allowable energy threshold (with a 10 second safe time, 
minimum potential energy associated with a glide slope multiplier of 1, and minimum 
kinetic energy associated with a speed of 1.3 times Vstall) flags 6,312% as many flights as 
the currently-used FSF stable approach criteria.  The lowest minimum allowable energy 
threshold (with a 5 second safe time, minimum altitude of 0.7 times the glideslope 
calculated altitude, and minimum speed of 1 times Vstall) flags 12% as many flights as the 
currently-used FSF stable approach criteria. 
The clusters of alerts in Figure 4 correspond to different specifications of minimum 
allowable airspeed in the alerting threshold.  A stall speed multiplier of 1.3 results in very 
large numbers of flights being flagged as “low energy”, approximately 6,000% higher than 
currently-used FSF stable approach criteria, which would undoubtedly result in a large 
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number of nuisance alerts.  Focusing on low kinetic energy thresholds of 1.2Vstall and 
lower, a more detailed view of the results is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to 
Those Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for Each Variant of Low Kinetic 
Energy Alerting Threshold. 
Again, three distinct groups of alerts correspond to the lower three stall speed 
multipliers, 1.2, 1.1, and 1.0.  For reference, the currently used FSF stable approach criteria 
detection rate is 100%.  Variation within each minimum kinetic energy cluster are due to a 
mix of minimum potential energy and safe time parameters (see Appendix A for full 
results). 
As previously discussed, the 96 different permutations of the alert algorithm were 
constructed by varying three different parameters: minimum allowable airspeed (a kinetic 
energy term), minimum allowable altitude or glide slope deviation (a potential energy 
term), and safe time.  By holding two of the parameters constant, and varying the third, it 
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is possible to observe the significance with which each parameter influences the detection 
rate of the algorithm.  First, an evaluation of varying minimum allowable kinetic energy is 
presented.  In Figure 6, the stall speed multiplier is varied, while holding the safe time 
constant at 7 seconds and the glide slope multiplier constant at 1. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to 
Those Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for A Variety of Low Kinetic Energy 
Alerting Thresholds. 
From this breakdown, it is clear to see how significantly varying the minimum 
required kinetic energy affects the number of flights flagged.  There are several theories 
for the reason of this significance.  First, as the kinetic energy term is based on some 
velocity squared, any changes in that velocity term are quadratic, rather than linear.  On a 
related note, aircraft are very sensitive to changes in airspeed on approach, and pilots 
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attempt to fly an approach at as constant an airspeed as possible.  As previously discussed, 
aircraft generally approach at approximately 1.3Vstall.  Thus, most flights flown will be at 
or slightly above this airspeed for nearly the entire approach, hence why variants of the 
algorithm with minimum kinetic energies based on airspeeds of 1.3Vstall or greater produce 
very large results. 
Next, Figure 7 shows the detection rate as a function of potential energy 
requirements.  In this analysis, the glide slope deviation multiplier is varied, while holding 
the stall speed multiplier constant at 1.2 and the safe time constant at 7 seconds. 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to 
Those Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for A Variety of Potential Energy 
Alerting Thresholds. 
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For context, a 10% change in the altitude corresponds to an approximately 0.3 degree 
change or slightly less than one dot on a glide slope indicator (approximately 0.5 degrees 
within a half scale deviation).  Therefore, the full deviation from 1 to 0.7 that was 
performed in this analysis roughly corresponds to two dots low on the glide slope.  FSF 
stable approach criteria only define being “on the correct flight path” as stable, and there 
seems to be no official definition for maximum deviation allowed.  From this analysis, it 
is shown that the change in flights flagged by the algorithm is roughly linear with respect 
to changing minimum allowable potential energy.  Compared to the previous analysis 
looking at kinetic energy, these results are also to be expected, as altitude is more variable 
during approaches than airspeed. 
Finally, an analysis of variation of safe time is performed as seen below in Figure 8.  
For this analysis, the stall speed multiplier was held constant at 1.2 and the glide slope 
multiplier was held constant at 1.0. 
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Figure 8. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to 
Those Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria for A Variety of Safe Time Alerting 
Thresholds 
Similar to the variation in minimum allowable potential energy, there is a fairly linear 
slope in terms of number of flights flagged by the algorithm as the tsafe parameter is varied.  
As all the look-ahead terms in the algorithm are linear, this linear variation is consistent 
with expectations.  Increasing the look ahead time means that aircraft that are decreasing 
in total energy too fast will have a larger correction to their predicted energy.  Therefore, 
greater look ahead time does indeed correlate with higher rates of detection.  Nonetheless, 
it should be noted that the increases in detection rates due to increased alerting time are 
much smaller than for other variations (a 10% range of detection rates across the evaluated 
safe time parameters, compared to approximately 40% for the evaluated glide slope 
variations and over 200% for minimum speed variations between Vstall and 1.2Vstall).  
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Therefore, it is hypothesized that increasing the safe time by a few seconds could enable 
pilots to have more time to respond without necessarily increasing the alerting rate to 
untenable levels. 
Lastly, detection rates as a function of both glide slope multiplier and safe time is 
presented in Figure 9.  These results show the detection rate of all alerts with a stall speed 
multiplier held constant at 1.2. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Number of Flights Triggering an Alert, Compared to 
Those Violating FSF Stable Approach Criteria, for A Variety of Potential Energy 





















































































4.4 FOQA Case Studies 
To further validate the alert with several exemplars, approaches out of the FOQA data set 
were analyzed to determine exactly when the alert triggered, especially as compared to the 
current FSF stable approach criteria.  Specific variants of the alert parameters were applied 
to these flights to demonstrate how they change when the alert would be triggered, as 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Alert Variants Used in FOQA Case Studies. 
tsafe GSx Vstallx 
10 1 1.2 
10 0.9 1.2 
9 1 1.2 
8 1 1.2 
7 1 1.3 
7 1 1.2 
7 1 1.1 
7 1 1 
7 0.9 1.2 
7 0.8 1.2 
7 0.7 1.2 
6 1 1.2 
5 1 1.2 
5 0.7 1 
This section presents three case studies.  The first is a stable approach in which no 
alerts were triggered except for the most sensitive variant of the proposed alert.  The second 
is a low energy approach in which all variants of the alert as well as the current FSF stable 
approach criteria were triggered.  Lastly, a case is presented which violated the current FSF 
stable approach criteria but not the low energy alert.  It should be noted that, in accordance 
with the non-disclosure agreement covering this thesis’ use of FOQA data, the analyses 
that follow are presented in a de-identified fashion with the vertical axis labels removed.   
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4.4.1 Stable Approach Case Study 
An analysis of the aircraft’s performance with regards to speed and vertical profile is first 
presented in a non-energy-based method.  Figure 10 displays the aircraft’s airspeed during 
the final approach with reference to the approach speed and stall speed.  Figure 11 displays 
the aircraft’s vertical profile in reference to the true glideslope on this approach. 
 












































































































































































Figure 11. Time History of Vertical Profile During a Stable Approach. 
As can be seen, the aircraft maintains a proper approach profile throughout the 
analyzed period.  Additionally, there appear to be no significant periods of excessive 
vertical speed or airspeed changes.  Thus, it is expected that this approach will be 
considered stable and should not trigger any variants of the total energy alert. 
Applying the low energy algorithm to the flight, the following results are obtained.  
Figure 12 displays the time history of the alerting algorithm’s predicted total energy and 














































































































































































Figure 12. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Stable 
Approach with Exemplar Alert Variants. 
For this flight, no variant of the alert was triggered, nor was any current FSF stable 
approach criteria triggered.  The alert with the lowest required energy of all variants 
analyzed is well below the predicted energy state of the aircraft for the entire approach.  
For context, alerts with the 1.2Vstall kinetic energy threshold were much more similar to 
each other than other variants. 
4.4.2 Low Energy Approach Case Study 
This section presents a flight in which both the proposed alert is triggered and the current 





































































































































































































Required Total Energy: tsafe=7, GSx=0.9, Vstallx=1.2
Required Total Energy: tsafe=5, GSx=0.7, Vstallx=1.0
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with regards speed and vertical profile is presented in a non-energy-based method.  Figure 
13 displays the aircraft’s airspeed during the final approach with reference to the approach 
speed and stall speed.  Figure 14 displays the aircraft’s vertical profile in reference to the 
true glideslope on this approach.  The point at which the FSF stable approach criteria flag 
the flight as unstable is denoted by the vertical red line. 
 






















































































































































Figure 14. Time History of Vertical Profile During a Low Energy Approach. 
As can be seen, the aircraft begins the final approach slightly below the glide slope 
but above the reference approach airspeed.  It appears as if the pilot flying corrected by 
pitching the aircraft to lose airspeed and recover the glide slope, and in doing so, triggered 
the unstable approach in the FOQA system.  For the remainder of the approach, the aircraft 
remained on or slightly above glide slope, but at a lower speed than required.  Thus, it is 
predicted that the aircraft will have adequate potential energy, but lower than required 
kinetic energy. 
Next, Figure 15 shows the alerting time as a function of minimum required kinetic 
energy.  Plotted are alert variants with the stall speed multiplier varying between 1.3 and 























































































































































the FSF stable approach criteria triggered at a recorder offset timestamp of 4627 seconds, 
as is indicated by the red vertical line. 
 
Figure 15. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Low 
Energy Approach with Changing Kinetic Energy Requirements with a Glide Slope 
Multiplier of 1.0 and a Safe Time of 7 seconds. 
Comparing these alert variants, significant differences are observed.  The alert variant with 
a stall speed multiplier of 1.2 triggered 6 seconds before the FSF stable approach criteria; 
the alert variant with a stall speed multiplier of 1.1 triggered 10 seconds after the FSF stable 
approach criteria; and the alert variant with a stall speed multiplier of just 1.0 did not trigger 



























































































































































influences the behavior of the alert, and the importance of correctly selecting a proper speed 
with which to base the alert.  
Next, to analyze the effect of varying minimum allowable potential energy, the same 
flight was used, and all alerting thresholds held the safe time at 7 seconds and the stall 
speed multiplier at 1.2, while varying the glide slope multiplier between 1.3 and 0.7.  The 
time history of the entire final approach is shown in Figure 16 and a detail view at the time 
which the predicted energy crosses the various required energy thresholds is shown in 
Figure 17, with the red vertical line denoting the time at which the FSF stable approach 
criteria flagged the approach as unstable. 
 
Figure 16. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Low 




























































































































































Figure 17. Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During a Low 
Energy Approach with Changing Potential Energy Requirements Expanded to 
Focus on the Time of Alerts. 
Much smaller differences in alerting time are found with these different thresholds 
on potential energy, compared to the earlier different kinetic energy thresholds.  
Nonetheless, it can be seen that higher glide slope multipliers (and thus higher potential 
energy requirements) do indeed lead to higher total energy requirements and, 
consequentially, a slightly earlier alert.  Alert variants with the highest required potential 
energy alerted 7 seconds earlier than the FSF stable approach criteria, whereas alert 
variants with lower potential energy requirements only alert 5 seconds earlier than the FSF 
stable approach criteria.  The red highlighted line, denoting where the FSF stable approach 
criteria triggered an unstable approach, appears to be in an area where the total energy 
drops temporarily, associated with a decrease in airspeed.   



















Lastly, an analysis of variation in safe time is presented.  This analysis is similar to 
that performed on varying safe time in evaluating the alert’s performance on Asiana 214.  
Again, it should be noted that, as the safe time parameter is used in calculation of both the 
minimum required energy, as well as the predicted energy, it is not possible to plot the 
different safe time varying required energy plots in the same chart.  Mathematical 
comparisons will instead be performed to evaluate the difference in energy required at a 
given time point, as was performed in the stable approach case study.  In this analysis, the 
safe time was varied between 5 and 10 seconds while holding the glide slope multiplier 
constant at 1 and the stall speed multiplier constant at 1.2.  The specific results of this 
analysis are detailed in Table 5.  Due to the similarity of the results, an additional 
comparison is provided in the three right columns of data, presented in a de-identified 
fashion, again, due to compliance with a non-disclosure agreement.  Each row shows the 
percent difference in predicted and required energy compared to the alert variant with a 
safe time of 10 seconds.  These values were taken at the point in the approach at which the 
alert triggered, 6 seconds prior to the FSF stable approach criteria in each case.  Values in 
excess of 100% indicate that the algorithm predicted or required higher energy for that alert 
variant than for the alert variant with a 10 second safe time.  In the right most column, the 


















10 6 100.000% 100.000% 0.000% 
9 6 100.118% 100.039% 0.079% 
8 6 100.236% 100.078% 0.159% 
7 6 100.355% 100.116% 0.238% 
6 6 100.473% 100.155% 0.317% 
5 6 100.591% 100.194% 0.397% 
Comparing these alert variants, it is clear to see that differences in safe time result in  
less change in the minimum allowable total energy, as was previously demonstrated in the 
stable Asiana 214 study, however these results show a much smaller change.  Reducing the 
safe time by 1 second results in a roughly 0.1% increase in the predicted energy, and a 
roughly 0.04% increase in required energy.  Due to this flight’s maintaining some throttle 
input above idle, the aircraft was not losing total energy at a rate comparable to Asiana 
214, reducing the predicted loss of total energy scaled by tsafe.  These slight variations are 
further displayed in Figure 18, showing a plot of the change in required energy compared 
to the change in predicted energy with decreasing safe time. 
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Figure 18.  Change in Required and Predicted Energies with Varying Safe Time. 
4.4.3 General Unstable Approach Case Study 
In this case study, a flight was selected which triggered the FSF stable approach criteria, 
but which did not trigger any but the most sensitive of the low energy alert variants.  Again, 
this case study begins with an analysis of the aircraft’s performance with regards to speed 
and vertical profile as presented in a non-energy-based method.  Figure 19 displays the 
aircraft’s airspeed during the final approach with reference to the approach speed and stall 
speed.  Figure 20 displays the aircraft’s vertical profile in reference to the true glide slope 
on this approach.  The point at which the FSF stable approach criteria flag the flight as 
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Figure 20. Time History of Vertical Profile During an Unstable but not Low Energy 
Approach. 
As can be seen, the aircraft begins the final approach slightly above the glide slope 
and very much above the reference approach airspeed.  Later in the approach, the aircraft 
appears to drop below the glide slope; however, the aircraft maintains a high airspeed 
throughout the approach.  This is an interesting example as the aircraft will therefore have 
low potential energy but high kinetic energy.  Given the dominance of the kinetic energy 
term in the previous case studies, it is expected that this term will again ensure the aircraft 
has an overall acceptable level of total energy. 
To demonstrate the range of required energy used in the alert threshold, a plot of 
minimum total energy as calculated with varying minimum required kinetic energy is 
shown in Figure 21.  The point at which the FSF stable approach criteria flags the approach 




































































































































































































Figure 21.  Time History of Predicted and Required Total Energy During an 
Unstable but not Low Energy Approach with Changing Kinetic Energy 
Requirements. 
In this case, the flight was flagged according to the FSF stable approach criteria as 
unstable due to a high rate of descent.  This can be seen in Figure 21 with the significant 
reduction in total energy seen just before the current FSF stable approach criteria flags the 
approach.  This high rate of descent translates into a faster reduction in potential energy.  
However, in addition to a high rate of descent, the flight was also noticeable for maintaining 
a high airspeed throughout the approach.  If so, the high airspeed offset the rate of descent 
and maintained the total energy at a level which did not trigger any low energy alerts.  It is 
hypothesized that the algorithm was correct in not alerting, as the aircraft maintained 
enough total energy for the instability to have been corrected through a pitching action, 












































































































































































































4.5 Summary and Recommendations 
From analysis of the approach of flight Asiana 214, it is clear that a low energy alert would 
likely have sounded earlier than the alerts onboard the aircraft where the total energy is 
low.  This result was also demonstrated in the FOQA case studies, which also found that, 
with appropriate threshold settings, the alert will not trigger when total energy is not too 
low. 
The timing of the alert is dominated by the kinetic energy threshold, with large 
variations in the alert time based on varying the minimum required kinetic energy.  
Minimum kinetic energy requirements based on a stall speed multiplier greater than 1.2 led 
to very large numbers of flights flagged.  This is due to a 1.3Vstall being the optimal airspeed 
at which most approaches are intended to be flown.  Thus, from a design perspective, it 
can be argued that the alert should be designed with a minimum kinetic energy of no greater 
than that associated with a speed of 1.3Vstall, and more likely, closer to 1.2Vstall.  
Additionally, it is suspected, though not confirmed, that stall speed multipliers of 1.1 and 
1 are too low to generate timely alerts; more research is warranted in this regard.   
The variations in minimum required potential energy and safe time were 
comparatively smaller in their effect in the cases analyzed.  Nonetheless, these parameters 
do affect the alerting time, and alerting even a few seconds earlier could have a significant 
impact on the safety of flight operations.  Therefore, the glide slope multiplier used should 
be greater than 0.7 or 0.8, as having a higher minimum required potential energy would 
likely alert slightly earlier.  However, given that the approach is intended to be flown on 
the glide slope (glide slope multiplier of 1), flying any higher would indicate the aircraft 
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still had energy that could be transferred from the potential store to the kinetic.  Alerting in 
this regime is better suited to the individual criteria alerts, and thus it is recommended that 
the total energy alert be designed with a glide slope multiplier of 1 or 0.9. 
Variation of safe time did not yield as significant changes in alerting time for the case 
studies analyzed as those found in the study of the Asiana 214 accident.  This is likely due 
to the dominance of the other terms in the algorithm during these case studies, none of 
which had significantly lower throttle settings leading to significant loss of total energy 
over the interval defined by tsafe.  In the case of Asiana 214, as the throttle remained at idle 
with the aircraft fully configured for landing, the aircraft was in a state which maximized 
drag and minimized thrust, magnifying the effect of tsafe on the change in predicted energy. 
It is suspected that a safe time of between 7 and 10 seconds is likely to yield meaningful 
results in cases such as the Asiana 214 accident, where these conditions are present.  
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This thesis detailed the design of an algorithm for a context dependent total energy alerting 
system for commercial aviation operations.  First, a background into the need for such an 
alert was described, including a detailed look into Asiana 214, an accident which directly 
inspired this design, and an overview of currently available technologies used to identify 
unstable approaches.  Much research has taken place to evaluate energy metrics for use in 
aviation, from applications in pilot training and post-flight analysis to design of autoflight 
systems.  However, little emphasis has been placed on developing alerts, particularly for 
situations in which pilots are manually flying the aircraft.  Additionally, little research has 
taken place evaluating the real-world utility of such an alert. 
The alert integrates data already available via sensors onboard air transport aircraft 
to estimate both the aircraft’s current energy state and the trend in total energy.  The 
algorithm creates a sum of energy from both kinetic and potential energy sources, and 
additionally calculates the rate of change of this total energy.  The algorithm then predicts 
the energy state of the aircraft at a given time in the future, as well as calculating minimum 
required energy at that time.  If the predicted energy is less than that which is required, the 
alert is triggered.  The future time horizon is intended to be long enough to allow pilots 
ample time to recover or abort the approach. 
Variants of the algorithm were applied to FOQA data for over 500,000 real flights to 
assess the parameters that define its alerting threshold.  Based on this analysis, it was 
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determined that the alert should be based on a minimum allowable kinetic energy defined 
by a stall speed multiplier of less than 1.3, as well as a minimum allowable potential energy 
defined by a glide slope multiplier of 0.9 or 1.0.  The safe time parameter, though found to 
be less impactful than the other variables in the FOQA case studies presented in this thesis, 
still affected the required and predicted energy in a meaningful way.  In cases where 
throttles are held at idle and the aircraft is fully configured for landing, variation of safe 
time may lead to earlier alerting times.  Thus, to allow extra reaction time, the safe time 
could be set between 7 and 10 seconds. 
5.2 Contributions 
While significant research in the area of stabilized approaches and energy metrics for flight 
path evaluation has been conducted, much of the research has been focused on autoflight 
systems, post flight evaluation, or pilot training.  The alert proposed herein is the first which 
has been designed to assist pilots by specifically warning against low energy approaches 
with both automatically flown approaches and those flown manually.   
Additionally, the alert was evaluated using a large set of real time flight data. This 
application allows for a larger-scale analysis of the design metrics of such an energy alert 
that, previously, was only performed on either small sets of flight data or in simulations 
with pilots actively flying.  This thesis showed the utility of such a total energy alert, and 
that the algorithm would predict the trend toward an unstable approach earlier than FSF 




A major limitation in the analysis is that the comparison of current FSF stable approach 
criteria to the system proposed provides an imperfect benchmark.  As noted as the start of 
this thesis, the current day FSF stable approach criteria are univariate, each looking at 
different components of total energy.  This comparison does nonetheless help to gain an 
understanding of how the proposed system would work in practice.  Another fundamental 
difference between the two systems is that the current FSF stable approach criteria look at 
immediate conditions, whereas the alert proposed in this thesis is designed to be predictive.  
The predictive component should lead to earlier alerts when total energy is decreasing, 
allowing for earlier pilot responses; however, a safe time that looks too far ahead may 
generate false alarms. 
Additionally, true evaluation of false alarm or missed detection rates would be 
impossible to make, again because there is no standard for determining the best alerting 
threshold.  The criteria to which this alert could be compared, namely the FSF Stable 
approach criteria, though based on statistical analysis of accident data, can alert on any of 
several conditions that may not collectively indicate a problem with total energy requiring, 
at least, increased throttle. 
Additional limitations are also present in the algorithm proposed here.  Other real-
world factors are present that were not taken into account in this thesis, which assumes a 
somewhat idealized model of an approach profile.  Also, crosswind components typically 
require an aircraft to fly an approach at a higher than normal speed, and thus may be low 
total energy, but would not necessarily activate an alert due to the higher than normal speed.  
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Additionally, while different aircraft configurations are currently implicitly factored into 
the algorithm by their effect on an aircraft’s stall speed, other effects of these configuration 
changes were not taken into account, such as the increased response time a pilot may need 
to raise flaps and gear to execute a go-around. 
5.4 Future Work 
Further data analysis of this alert could be completed with more robust data and further 
terms added to the algorithm.  One such example is the explicit incorporation of 
configuration changes into the algorithm, such as improper gear or flap setting.  
Additionally, factoring in some of the other above-mentioned limitations, such as 
crosswind components, would allow for a more robust alert.  Less crucially, while it is 
predicted that reducing assumptions such as a five second tspool or a three-degree glide slope 
have minimal effect on the analysis, since the variations between the assumed and likely 
actual values are minimal, this addition would technically allow greater resolution into and 
specificity of the alerting advance time.   
Additionally, as the alert was tested in a flight data post-processing environment, 
there is the opportunity to further the validation of this alert in real time tests, including 
simulator trials and flight testing to help add the human element, better specify the alerting 
characteristics, especially advanced alerting time, and help uncover real world influencing 
factors that have not yet been considered. 
 In addition to the mathematical criteria put forth in this thesis, consideration must 
be made for additional factors that can influence the effectiveness of the alert.  Broadly 
speaking, these factors include sensor characteristics, aircraft performance and human 
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factors.  For the purposes of this thesis analysis, sensor metrics similar to those of current 
day technology, including LAA, EGPWS, and the like, were assumed.  This is to emulate 
the most likely implementation scenario wherein the alert is programmed into the aircraft’s 
computers without adding additional sensor hardware.  Potential further research would 
evaluate, characterize, and recommend an optimal suite of sensors to be implemented 
natively in new aircraft designs. 
Aircraft performance must also be considered in the design of the alert.  In the alerting 
algorithm, engine spool time is factored into the advance warning time, tsafe.  Due to the 
large moment of inertia of modern turbofan engines, this is a non-insignificant time that 
must be factored into the overall equations.  Additionally, given that the aircraft is likely 
established on a certain descent profile, as the engines begin to power up, it will take a 
certain amount of time to arrest the descent; in other words, stop the energy decay and 
begin adding net energy.  This is a parameter that is commonly tracked on modern 
commercial aircraft and could be added as another contextual factor when implemented 
onboard aircraft. 
As previously mentioned, consideration must also be taken for human factors.  
Reaction time, at a minimum, dictates how much additional advanced warning is needed 
simply for pilots to hear an alert and react as trained.  This number, as presented in the alert 
algorithm as a component of tsafe, is somewhat variable and dependent on many factors 
including workload, attention, and the current mental and physical state of the pilot.  During 
approach, the aircraft is approaching a low total energy state and the pilot’s work load is 
somewhat high; however, given that the pilot is likely to be actively engaged in flying the 
approach, their attention is already primed for such an alert.  Therefore, consideration must 
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also be taken for allowing the pilot to be involved in the decision-making process.  Giving 
the pilots advanced warning may allow them to diagnose and potentially correct the 
situation.  However, this will also surely lead to a larger number of alerts (as the system is 
predictive, and uncertainty increases the further from the event the prediction is made), 
many of them potentially false.  Stemming from this concern is the potential for false 
alarms which may cause pilots to disregard the alert entirely, even when the alert properly 
predicts a dangerous situation.   
Thus, the potential for a phased alert seems appealing.  The aim of phased alerting 
would be to give enough advanced warning to pilots to allow them to correct the approach 
rather than simply go-around, but also reduce the severity of the alert early in the approach, 
so as to reduce the nuisance of such an alert.  This design could provide a minimally 
distracting notification early on and increase in severity and prominence should the aircraft 
progress toward a low total energy state.  As seen by the initial FOQA results, there is a 
clear quadratic curve in the number of flights flagged with different minimum energy 
requirements, with several groupings of alert threshold variants that have similar detection 
rates.  These groupings could be further evaluated for their utility as phases of an alert.   
Additionally, it should be noted that this system evaluated an aircraft’s energy state 
up to 2,000 feet HAT.  Because of this, many of the alert variants with very high minimum 
energy requirements alerted on flights where the captured “low energy states” were 
resolved before 1,000 feet HAT, the altitude at which the FSF stable approach criteria 
would begin evaluating.  This may or may not be considered a false detection, but situations 
like these could be seen as warranting such a lower priority “information only” alert rather 
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than a caution or warning, especially given the number of flights which were flagged with 
these higher minimum energy requirement alerts.   
Lastly, one must examine the factors surrounding human knowledge of an event.  If 
a pilot is already aware of a problem, and is taking steps to correct it, the alert could be 
seen as a nuisance.  As an easily implemented additional parameter, to avoid nuisance 
alerts, the system could also track the commanded thrust.  Significantly increasing 
commanded thrust values can be interpreted as pilot awareness of the low energy state and 
engagement in corrective action.  If the commanded thrust is sufficiently high, indicating 
such pilot awareness, the alert could be silenced. 
Alternatively, if a pilot is suspicious of a problem, or is unsure of how to act, given 
inadequate training or concerns over command structure, an alert may help to give that 
pilot the needed assurance that their belief is correct and can justify their action calling for 
a go-around, or mandate a go-around even when the pilot was attempting to salvage the 
approach.  Indeed, when reviewing the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) of Asiana 214, one 
of the junior pilots noted the unstable appearance of the approach before any alarms sound 
but did not call for a go-around when his suspicions were initially aroused, and the trainee 
captain continued to attempt to salvage the approach even when suspicions were first 
raised, until the quad-chime low airspeed alert clearly indicated a problem warranting 
action (Boeing, 2014). 
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APPENDIX A: FOQA ANALYSIS RESULTS TABLE 
The following is the full list of results from the FOQA analysis for each variant of the alert, 
ranked by number of flights flagged.  Included for context, is the FSF stable approach 
criteria, at a rank of 170.  This analysis initially also evaluated alert variants with glide 
slope multipliers up to 1.3, and stall speed multipliers up to 1.5.  These high energy results 
were not considered valid for the analysis presented in this thesis but are shown here for 
completeness.  The data is presented organized in two versions.  First, the alert variants are 
ranked by number of flights flagged by each.  Second, alert variants are numbered in the 
order in which they were built and labeled, for easier reference. 
Rank Alert # tsafe GSx Vstallx Ratio of flights 
flagged to FSF stable 
approach criteria 
flights flagged 
1 1 10 1.3 1.5 13217% 
2 43 9 1.3 1.5 13217% 
3 85 8 1.3 1.5 13217% 
4 127 7 1.3 1.5 13216% 
5 7 10 1.2 1.5 13216% 
6 49 9 1.2 1.5 13215% 
7 169 6 1.3 1.5 13215% 
8 91 8 1.2 1.5 13215% 
9 211 5 1.3 1.5 13215% 
10 133 7 1.2 1.5 13215% 
11 175 6 1.2 1.5 13214% 
12 13 10 1.1 1.5 13214% 
13 55 9 1.1 1.5 13213% 
14 217 5 1.2 1.5 13213% 
15 97 8 1.1 1.5 13213% 
16 139 7 1.1 1.5 13212% 
17 19 10 1 1.5 13212% 
18 61 9 1 1.5 13211% 
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19 181 6 1.1 1.5 13211% 
20 223 5 1.1 1.5 13211% 
21 103 8 1 1.5 13211% 
22 145 7 1 1.5 13210% 
23 25 10 0.9 1.5 13209% 
24 187 6 1 1.5 13209% 
25 67 9 0.9 1.5 13209% 
26 229 5 1 1.5 13209% 
27 31 10 0.8 1.5 13208% 
28 109 8 0.9 1.5 13208% 
29 151 7 0.9 1.5 13208% 
30 73 9 0.8 1.5 13207% 
31 37 10 0.7 1.5 13207% 
32 193 6 0.9 1.5 13207% 
33 115 8 0.8 1.5 13207% 
34 79 9 0.7 1.5 13206% 
35 235 5 0.9 1.5 13206% 
36 157 7 0.8 1.5 13206% 
37 199 6 0.8 1.5 13205% 
38 121 8 0.7 1.5 13205% 
39 241 5 0.8 1.5 13205% 
40 163 7 0.7 1.5 13204% 
41 205 6 0.7 1.5 13204% 
42 247 5 0.7 1.5 13203% 
43 2 10 1.3 1.4 12417% 
44 44 9 1.3 1.4 12412% 
45 86 8 1.3 1.4 12408% 
46 8 10 1.2 1.4 12403% 
47 128 7 1.3 1.4 12403% 
48 170 6 1.3 1.4 12399% 
49 50 9 1.2 1.4 12395% 
50 92 8 1.2 1.4 12390% 
51 134 7 1.2 1.4 12385% 
52 14 10 1.1 1.4 12384% 
53 176 6 1.2 1.4 12379% 
54 56 9 1.1 1.4 12378% 
55 218 5 1.2 1.4 12374% 
56 98 8 1.1 1.4 12372% 
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57 20 10 1 1.4 12368% 
58 140 7 1.1 1.4 12366% 
59 62 9 1 1.4 12361% 
60 182 6 1.1 1.4 12359% 
61 212 5 1.3 1.4 12359% 
62 104 8 1 1.4 12354% 
63 224 5 1.1 1.4 12353% 
64 26 10 0.9 1.4 12352% 
65 146 7 1 1.4 12347% 
66 68 9 0.9 1.4 12345% 
67 188 6 1 1.4 12340% 
68 32 10 0.8 1.4 12338% 
69 110 8 0.9 1.4 12336% 
70 230 5 1 1.4 12332% 
71 74 9 0.8 1.4 12328% 
72 152 7 0.9 1.4 12328% 
73 38 10 0.7 1.4 12323% 
74 194 6 0.9 1.4 12320% 
75 116 8 0.8 1.4 12320% 
76 80 9 0.7 1.4 12314% 
77 236 5 0.9 1.4 12313% 
78 158 7 0.8 1.4 12311% 
79 122 8 0.7 1.4 12306% 
80 200 6 0.8 1.4 12302% 
81 164 7 0.7 1.4 12296% 
82 242 5 0.8 1.4 12294% 
83 206 6 0.7 1.4 12286% 
84 248 5 0.7 1.4 12276% 
85 3 10 1.3 1.3 6502% 
86 45 9 1.3 1.3 6483% 
87 87 8 1.3 1.3 6465% 
88 129 7 1.3 1.3 6446% 
89 9 10 1.2 1.3 6431% 
90 171 6 1.3 1.3 6430% 
91 213 5 1.3 1.3 6413% 
92 51 9 1.2 1.3 6412% 
93 93 8 1.2 1.3 6392% 
94 135 7 1.2 1.3 6371% 
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95 15 10 1.1 1.3 6370% 
96 177 6 1.2 1.3 6353% 
97 57 9 1.1 1.3 6347% 
98 219 5 1.2 1.3 6333% 
99 99 8 1.1 1.3 6324% 
100 21 10 1 1.3 6312% 
101 141 7 1.1 1.3 6301% 
102 63 9 1 1.3 6285% 
103 183 6 1.1 1.3 6278% 
104 105 8 1 1.3 6259% 
105 27 10 0.9 1.3 6258% 
106 225 5 1.1 1.3 6255% 
107 147 7 1 1.3 6233% 
108 69 9 0.9 1.3 6229% 
109 33 10 0.8 1.3 6210% 
110 189 6 1 1.3 6207% 
111 111 8 0.9 1.3 6201% 
112 75 9 0.8 1.3 6181% 
113 231 5 1 1.3 6181% 
114 153 7 0.9 1.3 6172% 
115 39 10 0.7 1.3 6167% 
116 117 8 0.8 1.3 6148% 
117 195 6 0.9 1.3 6142% 
118 81 9 0.7 1.3 6133% 
119 159 7 0.8 1.3 6116% 
120 237 5 0.9 1.3 6114% 
121 123 8 0.7 1.3 6099% 
122 201 6 0.8 1.3 6083% 
123 165 7 0.7 1.3 6062% 
124 243 5 0.8 1.3 6051% 
125 207 6 0.7 1.3 6027% 
126 249 5 0.7 1.3 5992% 
128 4 10 1.3 1.2 238% 
129 46 9 1.3 1.2 236% 
130 88 8 1.3 1.2 235% 
131 130 7 1.3 1.2 234% 
132 172 6 1.3 1.2 232% 
133 214 5 1.3 1.2 230% 
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134 10 10 1.2 1.2 230% 
135 52 9 1.2 1.2 227% 
136 94 8 1.2 1.2 225% 
137 136 7 1.2 1.2 224% 
138 178 6 1.2 1.2 223% 
139 16 10 1.1 1.2 222% 
140 220 5 1.2 1.2 221% 
141 58 9 1.1 1.2 220% 
142 100 8 1.1 1.2 218% 
143 142 7 1.1 1.2 216% 
144 22 10 1 1.2 215% 
145 184 6 1.1 1.2 214% 
146 64 9 1 1.2 213% 
147 226 5 1.1 1.2 212% 
148 106 8 1 1.2 211% 
149 28 10 0.9 1.2 209% 
150 148 7 1 1.2 209% 
151 70 9 0.9 1.2 207% 
152 190 6 1 1.2 207% 
153 112 8 0.9 1.2 205% 
154 232 5 1 1.2 205% 
155 34 10 0.8 1.2 205% 
156 154 7 0.9 1.2 202% 
157 76 9 0.8 1.2 202% 
158 40 10 0.7 1.2 201% 
159 196 6 0.9 1.2 200% 
160 118 8 0.8 1.2 200% 
161 238 5 0.9 1.2 198% 
162 82 9 0.7 1.2 198% 
163 160 7 0.8 1.2 197% 
164 124 8 0.7 1.2 196% 
165 202 6 0.8 1.2 195% 
166 166 7 0.7 1.2 193% 
167 244 5 0.8 1.2 193% 
168 208 6 0.7 1.2 190% 
169 250 5 0.7 1.2 188% 
170 Current Current Current Current 100% 
171 5 10 1.3 1.1 20% 
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172 47 9 1.3 1.1 20% 
173 89 8 1.3 1.1 20% 
174 131 7 1.3 1.1 20% 
175 173 6 1.3 1.1 20% 
176 215 5 1.3 1.1 20% 
177 11 10 1.2 1.1 20% 
178 53 9 1.2 1.1 20% 
179 95 8 1.2 1.1 20% 
180 137 7 1.2 1.1 20% 
181 179 6 1.2 1.1 20% 
182 221 5 1.2 1.1 20% 
183 101 8 1.1 1.1 20% 
184 143 7 1.1 1.1 20% 
185 17 10 1.1 1.1 20% 
186 59 9 1.1 1.1 20% 
187 185 6 1.1 1.1 20% 
188 227 5 1.1 1.1 20% 
189 23 10 1 1.1 19% 
190 65 9 1 1.1 19% 
191 107 8 1 1.1 19% 
192 149 7 1 1.1 19% 
193 191 6 1 1.1 19% 
194 233 5 1 1.1 19% 
195 29 10 0.9 1.1 19% 
196 71 9 0.9 1.1 19% 
197 113 8 0.9 1.1 19% 
198 155 7 0.9 1.1 19% 
199 197 6 0.9 1.1 19% 
200 239 5 0.9 1.1 19% 
201 35 10 0.8 1.1 19% 
202 77 9 0.8 1.1 19% 
203 119 8 0.8 1.1 19% 
204 161 7 0.8 1.1 19% 
205 203 6 0.8 1.1 19% 
206 245 5 0.8 1.1 19% 
207 41 10 0.7 1.1 19% 
208 83 9 0.7 1.1 19% 
209 125 8 0.7 1.1 19% 
 68 
210 167 7 0.7 1.1 19% 
211 209 6 0.7 1.1 19% 
212 251 5 0.7 1.1 19% 
213 6 10 1.3 1 13% 
214 48 9 1.3 1 13% 
215 90 8 1.3 1 13% 
216 132 7 1.3 1 13% 
217 174 6 1.3 1 13% 
218 216 5 1.3 1 13% 
219 12 10 1.2 1 12% 
220 24 10 1 1 12% 
221 18 10 1.1 1 12% 
222 30 10 0.9 1 12% 
223 36 10 0.8 1 12% 
224 66 9 1 1 12% 
225 72 9 0.9 1 12% 
226 78 9 0.8 1 12% 
227 42 10 0.7 1 12% 
228 54 9 1.2 1 12% 
229 84 9 0.7 1 12% 
230 96 8 1.2 1 12% 
231 120 8 0.8 1 12% 
232 126 8 0.7 1 12% 
233 138 7 1.2 1 12% 
234 60 9 1.1 1 12% 
235 108 8 1 1 12% 
236 114 8 0.9 1 12% 
237 180 6 1.2 1 12% 
238 102 8 1.1 1 12% 
239 150 7 1 1 12% 
240 156 7 0.9 1 12% 
241 222 5 1.2 1 12% 
242 144 7 1.1 1 12% 
243 162 7 0.8 1 12% 
244 168 7 0.7 1 12% 
245 192 6 1 1 12% 
246 198 6 0.9 1 12% 
247 186 6 1.1 1 12% 
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248 204 6 0.8 1 12% 
249 210 6 0.7 1 12% 
250 240 5 0.9 1 12% 
251 246 5 0.8 1 12% 
252 228 5 1.1 1 12% 
253 234 5 1 1 12% 
254 252 5 0.7 1 12% 
 
Alert variants ordered as evaluated: 
Alert # Rank tsafe GSx Vstallx Ratio of flights 
flagged to FSF stable 
approach criteria 
flights flagged 
1 1 10 1.3 1.5 13217% 
2 43 10 1.3 1.4 12417% 
3 85 10 1.3 1.3 6502% 
4 128 10 1.3 1.2 238% 
5 171 10 1.3 1.1 20% 
6 213 10 1.3 1 13% 
7 5 10 1.2 1.5 13216% 
8 46 10 1.2 1.4 12403% 
9 89 10 1.2 1.3 6431% 
10 134 10 1.2 1.2 230% 
11 177 10 1.2 1.1 20% 
12 219 10 1.2 1 12% 
13 12 10 1.1 1.5 13214% 
14 52 10 1.1 1.4 12384% 
15 95 10 1.1 1.3 6370% 
16 139 10 1.1 1.2 222% 
17 185 10 1.1 1.1 20% 
18 221 10 1.1 1 12% 
19 17 10 1 1.5 13212% 
20 57 10 1 1.4 12368% 
21 100 10 1 1.3 6312% 
22 144 10 1 1.2 215% 
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23 189 10 1 1.1 19% 
24 220 10 1 1 12% 
25 23 10 0.9 1.5 13209% 
26 64 10 0.9 1.4 12352% 
27 105 10 0.9 1.3 6258% 
28 149 10 0.9 1.2 209% 
29 195 10 0.9 1.1 19% 
30 222 10 0.9 1 12% 
31 27 10 0.8 1.5 13208% 
32 68 10 0.8 1.4 12338% 
33 109 10 0.8 1.3 6210% 
34 155 10 0.8 1.2 205% 
35 201 10 0.8 1.1 19% 
36 223 10 0.8 1 12% 
37 31 10 0.7 1.5 13207% 
38 73 10 0.7 1.4 12323% 
39 115 10 0.7 1.3 6167% 
40 158 10 0.7 1.2 201% 
41 207 10 0.7 1.1 19% 
42 227 10 0.7 1 12% 
43 2 9 1.3 1.5 13217% 
44 44 9 1.3 1.4 12412% 
45 86 9 1.3 1.3 6483% 
46 129 9 1.3 1.2 236% 
47 172 9 1.3 1.1 20% 
48 214 9 1.3 1 13% 
49 6 9 1.2 1.5 13215% 
50 49 9 1.2 1.4 12395% 
51 92 9 1.2 1.3 6412% 
52 135 9 1.2 1.2 227% 
53 178 9 1.2 1.1 20% 
54 228 9 1.2 1 12% 
55 13 9 1.1 1.5 13213% 
56 54 9 1.1 1.4 12378% 
57 97 9 1.1 1.3 6347% 
58 141 9 1.1 1.2 220% 
59 186 9 1.1 1.1 20% 
60 234 9 1.1 1 12% 
 71 
61 18 9 1 1.5 13211% 
62 59 9 1 1.4 12361% 
63 102 9 1 1.3 6285% 
64 146 9 1 1.2 213% 
65 190 9 1 1.1 19% 
66 224 9 1 1 12% 
67 25 9 0.9 1.5 13209% 
68 66 9 0.9 1.4 12345% 
69 108 9 0.9 1.3 6229% 
70 151 9 0.9 1.2 207% 
71 196 9 0.9 1.1 19% 
72 225 9 0.9 1 12% 
73 30 9 0.8 1.5 13207% 
74 71 9 0.8 1.4 12328% 
75 112 9 0.8 1.3 6181% 
76 157 9 0.8 1.2 202% 
77 202 9 0.8 1.1 19% 
78 226 9 0.8 1 12% 
79 34 9 0.7 1.5 13206% 
80 76 9 0.7 1.4 12314% 
81 118 9 0.7 1.3 6133% 
82 162 9 0.7 1.2 198% 
83 208 9 0.7 1.1 19% 
84 229 9 0.7 1 12% 
85 3 8 1.3 1.5 13217% 
86 45 8 1.3 1.4 12408% 
87 87 8 1.3 1.3 6465% 
88 130 8 1.3 1.2 235% 
89 173 8 1.3 1.1 20% 
90 215 8 1.3 1 13% 
91 8 8 1.2 1.5 13215% 
92 50 8 1.2 1.4 12390% 
93 93 8 1.2 1.3 6392% 
94 136 8 1.2 1.2 225% 
95 179 8 1.2 1.1 20% 
96 230 8 1.2 1 12% 
97 15 8 1.1 1.5 13213% 
98 56 8 1.1 1.4 12372% 
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99 99 8 1.1 1.3 6324% 
100 142 8 1.1 1.2 218% 
101 183 8 1.1 1.1 20% 
102 238 8 1.1 1 12% 
103 21 8 1 1.5 13211% 
104 62 8 1 1.4 12354% 
105 104 8 1 1.3 6259% 
106 148 8 1 1.2 211% 
107 191 8 1 1.1 19% 
108 235 8 1 1 12% 
109 28 8 0.9 1.5 13208% 
110 69 8 0.9 1.4 12336% 
111 111 8 0.9 1.3 6201% 
112 153 8 0.9 1.2 205% 
113 197 8 0.9 1.1 19% 
114 236 8 0.9 1 12% 
115 33 8 0.8 1.5 13207% 
116 75 8 0.8 1.4 12320% 
117 116 8 0.8 1.3 6148% 
118 160 8 0.8 1.2 200% 
119 203 8 0.8 1.1 19% 
120 231 8 0.8 1 12% 
121 38 8 0.7 1.5 13205% 
122 79 8 0.7 1.4 12306% 
123 121 8 0.7 1.3 6099% 
124 164 8 0.7 1.2 196% 
125 209 8 0.7 1.1 19% 
126 232 8 0.7 1 12% 
127 4 7 1.3 1.5 13216% 
128 47 7 1.3 1.4 12403% 
129 88 7 1.3 1.3 6446% 
130 131 7 1.3 1.2 234% 
131 174 7 1.3 1.1 20% 
132 216 7 1.3 1 13% 
133 10 7 1.2 1.5 13215% 
134 51 7 1.2 1.4 12385% 
135 94 7 1.2 1.3 6371% 
136 137 7 1.2 1.2 224% 
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137 180 7 1.2 1.1 20% 
138 233 7 1.2 1 12% 
139 16 7 1.1 1.5 13212% 
140 58 7 1.1 1.4 12366% 
141 101 7 1.1 1.3 6301% 
142 143 7 1.1 1.2 216% 
143 184 7 1.1 1.1 20% 
144 242 7 1.1 1 12% 
145 22 7 1 1.5 13210% 
146 65 7 1 1.4 12347% 
147 107 7 1 1.3 6233% 
148 150 7 1 1.2 209% 
149 192 7 1 1.1 19% 
150 239 7 1 1 12% 
151 29 7 0.9 1.5 13208% 
152 72 7 0.9 1.4 12328% 
153 114 7 0.9 1.3 6172% 
154 156 7 0.9 1.2 202% 
155 198 7 0.9 1.1 19% 
156 240 7 0.9 1 12% 
157 36 7 0.8 1.5 13206% 
158 78 7 0.8 1.4 12311% 
159 119 7 0.8 1.3 6116% 
160 163 7 0.8 1.2 197% 
161 204 7 0.8 1.1 19% 
162 243 7 0.8 1 12% 
163 40 7 0.7 1.5 13204% 
164 81 7 0.7 1.4 12296% 
165 123 7 0.7 1.3 6062% 
166 166 7 0.7 1.2 193% 
167 210 7 0.7 1.1 19% 
168 244 7 0.7 1 12% 
169 7 6 1.3 1.5 13215% 
170 48 6 1.3 1.4 12399% 
171 90 6 1.3 1.3 6430% 
172 132 6 1.3 1.2 232% 
173 175 6 1.3 1.1 20% 
174 217 6 1.3 1 13% 
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175 11 6 1.2 1.5 13214% 
176 53 6 1.2 1.4 12379% 
177 96 6 1.2 1.3 6353% 
178 138 6 1.2 1.2 223% 
179 181 6 1.2 1.1 20% 
180 237 6 1.2 1 12% 
181 19 6 1.1 1.5 13211% 
182 60 6 1.1 1.4 12359% 
183 103 6 1.1 1.3 6278% 
184 145 6 1.1 1.2 214% 
185 187 6 1.1 1.1 20% 
186 247 6 1.1 1 12% 
187 24 6 1 1.5 13209% 
188 67 6 1 1.4 12340% 
189 110 6 1 1.3 6207% 
190 152 6 1 1.2 207% 
191 193 6 1 1.1 19% 
192 245 6 1 1 12% 
193 32 6 0.9 1.5 13207% 
194 74 6 0.9 1.4 12320% 
195 117 6 0.9 1.3 6142% 
196 159 6 0.9 1.2 200% 
197 199 6 0.9 1.1 19% 
198 246 6 0.9 1 12% 
199 37 6 0.8 1.5 13205% 
200 80 6 0.8 1.4 12302% 
201 122 6 0.8 1.3 6083% 
202 165 6 0.8 1.2 195% 
203 205 6 0.8 1.1 19% 
204 248 6 0.8 1 12% 
205 41 6 0.7 1.5 13204% 
206 83 6 0.7 1.4 12286% 
207 125 6 0.7 1.3 6027% 
208 168 6 0.7 1.2 190% 
209 211 6 0.7 1.1 19% 
210 249 6 0.7 1 12% 
211 9 5 1.3 1.5 13215% 
212 61 5 1.3 1.4 12359% 
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213 91 5 1.3 1.3 6413% 
214 133 5 1.3 1.2 230% 
215 176 5 1.3 1.1 20% 
216 218 5 1.3 1 13% 
217 14 5 1.2 1.5 13213% 
218 55 5 1.2 1.4 12374% 
219 98 5 1.2 1.3 6333% 
220 140 5 1.2 1.2 221% 
221 182 5 1.2 1.1 20% 
222 241 5 1.2 1 12% 
223 20 5 1.1 1.5 13211% 
224 63 5 1.1 1.4 12353% 
225 106 5 1.1 1.3 6255% 
226 147 5 1.1 1.2 212% 
227 188 5 1.1 1.1 20% 
228 252 5 1.1 1 12% 
229 26 5 1 1.5 13209% 
230 70 5 1 1.4 12332% 
231 113 5 1 1.3 6181% 
232 154 5 1 1.2 205% 
233 194 5 1 1.1 19% 
234 253 5 1 1 12% 
235 35 5 0.9 1.5 13206% 
236 77 5 0.9 1.4 12313% 
237 120 5 0.9 1.3 6114% 
238 161 5 0.9 1.2 198% 
239 200 5 0.9 1.1 19% 
240 250 5 0.9 1 12% 
241 39 5 0.8 1.5 13205% 
242 82 5 0.8 1.4 12294% 
243 124 5 0.8 1.3 6051% 
244 167 5 0.8 1.2 193% 
245 206 5 0.8 1.1 19% 
246 251 5 0.8 1 12% 
247 42 5 0.7 1.5 13203% 
248 84 5 0.7 1.4 12276% 
249 126 5 0.7 1.3 5992% 
250 169 5 0.7 1.2 188% 
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251 212 5 0.7 1.1 19% 
252 254 5 0.7 1 12% 
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